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GDP in 2005 
Dimitar Chobanov 
 
Preliminary data for the gross domestic product 
(GDP) in 2005 were released recently as well as 
revised data for 2004. Real GDP growth in 2005 
is 5.5 per cent, which was not a surprise for the 
independent analysts and for the government 
agencies’ experts. Some difference from the 
expected level can be found in the nominal GDP 
that reached BGN 41 948 million which means 
that the nominal growth is 9.6 per cent. The 
growth rate has slowed down relative to 2004 in 
real and in nominal terms which can be 
accounted as an unfavorable development for the 
economy. 
Real growth rate of the gross value added 
(GVA) is 5.1 per cent and is also slower than 
2004 (5.4 per cent). The tendency during the last 
few years is for the GVA to increase fastest in 
real terms in the industrial sector and in 2005 its 
growth was 7.3 per cent while the growth in 
services is 6.6 per cent. One of the reasons for 
this positive development is the increasing share 
of private property in these sectors due to the 
privatization and the natural emerging of new 
enterprises in the country. During the last year as 
well as the preceding years some measures were 
taken which created a better environment for 
business and the most substantial one is the 
reduction of the corporate tax rate to 15 per cent 
and the lowering of labor taxation. 
Unfortunately, the chance for more sizable 
changes in tax legislation was missed because of 
the implemented policy for fiscal surplus. Thus 
more money than needed for financing the 
superfluous expenditures of the government was 
taken from companies and citizens. 
In 2005, the ratio between the revenues in 
consolidated government budget and the GDP 
reached its highest value after the introduction of 
the currency board which implies that the total 
tax burden on the economy has risen. Thus the 
government restricts the freedom of Bulgarians 
to dispose the income they produce and reduces 
their incentives to work and to take a risk by 
entrepreneurship that, in turn, lowers the 
opportunities for higher economic growth. 
Indeed, higher economic growth is a necessity 
for Bulgarians because the level of their income 
is still too low relative to the citizens of the 
European Union 25 (31.8 per cent) and relative 
to these of the United States (20.9 per cent). 
However, this is determined to a great extent by 
the labor productivity, taking into account all the 
inherent shortcomings in calculation of this 
indicator, which is 32.5 per cent of EU 25 
average and 23.7 per cent of this in the United 
States.1 
While one can observe real growth in the sectors 
of industry and services, this is not the case in 
the agriculture where the physical volume of the 
production falls by 8.4 per cent in 2005. The 
influence of floods is visible at the greatest 
                                                 
1 Data are taken from Eurostat. 
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extent precisely in this sector although the 
effects stemming from it spread into the other 
sectors. Measures taken by the government were 
not adequate and granted funds did not achieve 
the desired results. Their utilization was 
nontransparent and almost unnecessary due to 
the way it was done. The lack of development in 
the agriculture is a substantial problem and if 
there are more floods again in 2006 the results 
will be similar. 
Private sector share in the value added continues 
rising because of the tendency of its production 
to increase while that of the public sector 
decreases. While in previous years it was due to 
the privatization of the state-owned enterprises, 
in 2005, due to the parliamentary elections, the 
privatization process virtually stopped. Hence 
the amount of the state property did not change 
significantly, the number of employed persons in 
this sector rose but the “value added” dropped 
down by 5.2 per cent.2 The private sector is the 
real engine of the economy and it created 
sustainable new jobs thus expanding the 
employment as a whole. 
The other important elements of GDP are the 
adjustments which include net taxes on products 
and indirect assessment of the financial 
intermediaries’ services. Dynamic development 
of crediting during the year and the rise in 
excises on some goods led to real growth rate of 
8.1 per cent which is slightly higher than the rate 
in 2004. It looks like the attempts of the central 
bank to restrict the credit expansion have not 
affected the results of commercial banks in full 
strength in 2005 but one can expect that this 
would happen in greater extent in 2006. 
The final consumption in 2005 accelerates its 
growth to 6.8 per cent from 5.1 per cent in 2004. 
Individual consumption has a larger contribution 
for this because it increases by 7.4 per cent while 
collective consumption rises by 2.2 per cent. The 
development during the last quarter is of 
particular interest because the collective 
consumption falls by 4.7 per cent which is a 
significant difference relative to the situation in 
the preceding years. Then, the growth rate of this 
indicator was the highest exactly in this quarter 
(in 2004 it is 7.8 per cent, in 2003 it is 8.2 per 
cent, in 2002 it is 8.3 per cent). Collective 
consumption is a measure for government’s 
                                                 
2 One can argue if the public sector really adds value 
to the economy. This that is actually done in this 
sector is a redistribution of the value added in private 
sector. 
expenditures on collective services like 
maintenance of settlements, scientific research, 
administration, defense and security of the 
country. Reducing these costs represents a 
positive development because their size is too 
high relative to the results which stem from 
them. 
An important role for this progress is played by 
the persistence of the International Monetary 
Fund officials for a fiscal surplus which forced 
the government to limit the unnecessary 
spending at the end of the year. An example for 
such spending was the situation at the end of 
2004 when a company for public investment 
projects had to be created because the 
government was not able to spend the money as 
was planned. Apart from this, in 2005 the 
amendments in legislation were made that limit 
the opportunities for budget spending without 
the approval of the parliament. 
The rise in consumption, however, contributes to 
a fall in savings in the Bulgarian economy. 
Gross savings in 2005 represent 16.9 per cent of 
GDP while they were 19 per cent of GDP in 
2004. This development is combined with a rise 
in investments measured by gross fixed capital 
formation which reaches its highest ratio to GDP 
since the democratic changes of 23.8 per cent. 
The result is a higher current account deficit due 
to insufficient savings to finance these 
investments. If the direction of these two 
indicators retains in 2006 one can expect higher 
deficit in the current account of the balance of 
payments. 
The real growth rate of the GDP in 2005 is 
significantly higher than the EU average which 
is around 1.6 per cent but, on the other hand, it is 
lower than in Latvia – 10.2 per cent, Estonia – 
9.8 per cent, Lithuania – 7.5 per cent, Czech and 
Slovak Republic – 6 per cent. These countries 
realize higher growth at higher base. Hence, the 
real divergence of Bulgaria from them is even 
larger. Data for these countries are indicative 
that the economic policies implemented by their 
governments during the last years are successful. 
These policies are directed toward broadening 
the economic freedom, lower and flatter taxes, 
facilitating starting and doing business, and 
advancing the protection of property rights. 
Some aspects of these policies were adopted in 
Bulgaria but, unfortunately, the political will for 
faster and deeper reforms that could accelerate 
growth is absent. For this reason one cannot 
expect that this will happen in the next few years 
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and the incomes in the country will remain low for a long time to come. 
 
 
The Tax Reform is Working (Analysis of 
Budget Statistics) 
Georgi Angelov 
 
The Ministry of Finance published data on the 
execution of the government budget for the first 
two months of 2006. The data is quite interesting 
and deserve detailed analysis. 
In the first two months of 2006 the revenues in 
the consolidated government budget exceeded 
2.7 billion leva – an increase of 6.6% compared 
to the same period of the previous year. The 
budget expenditures increase by almost the same 
rate – 6.5% and reach 2.56 billion leva. The 
budget surplus is also greater than last year – till 
the end of February it is 146.5 million leva, 9% 
higher than the corresponding level in 2005. 
 
Table 1: State budget – execution to February 
thousand leva 2005 2006 Change
Revenues 2,536,060 2,704,680 6.6% 
Expenditures 2,401,677 2,558,217 6.5% 
Surplus 134,383 146,463 9.0% 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
 
If we look at the budget expenditures, we can 
see that some expenditure rise a lot – wages, 
social security contributions, and other decrease 
considerably – subsidies, maintenance. As the 
state employees have not received 60% increase 
of their wages, we can explain the rise of the 
wage expenditures (and the decrease in other 
items) only with shift in the accounting of the 
expenditures. Because of this reason the 
comparison of the data is difficult and details are 
difficult to be analyzed. 
In respect to the total spending, it is clear that its 
growth is higher than in the previous year, which 
is not a good sign. In order to have stability of 
the public finance, it would be better to have 
slower increase of expenditures. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Expenditures of the state budget - 
execution to February 
thousand leva 2005 2006 Change
Wages 243,825 390,792 60.3% 
Social security contributions 87,778 125,211 42.6% 
Maintenance 557,387 453,447 -18.6%
Interest 336,713 318,142 -5.5% 
Social expenditures 947,714 1,076,113 13.5% 
Subsidies 77,179 56,660 -26.6%
Capital expenditures 151,081 137,852 -8.8% 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
 
In the first two months of the year the revenues 
of all taxes are rising, with the exception of the 
excise duties. It is ironic, as excises are taxes 
that were increased significantly in the 
beginning of the year. The dividend tax revenues 
continue to rise by a tremendous rate – more 
than 50%. VAT receipt increase by almost 25% 
and the corporate and income taxes – by a little 
more than 10%. Even the social security tax 
revenues are increasing although their rate was 
decreased in the beginning of 2006 by 6 
percentage points (from 42.7% to 36.7%). 
 
Table 3: Tax revenues – execution to February 
   2005 2006 Change 
Social security tax 648,552 651,890 0.5% 
Corporate tax 89,992 100,498 11.7% 
Dividend tax 14,358 21,823 52.0% 
Income tax 196,419 216,555 10.3% 
VAT 695,181 867,600 24.8% 
Excises 323,832 290,446 -10.3% 
Customs duties 52,191 56,570 8.4% 
Other 39,585 41,057 3.7% 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
 
There are several tendencies that can be seen in 
the data on the execution of the state budget for 
the first two months of 2006: 
1. Social security tax revenues increase 
despite the lower tax rate. This is a sign 
for positive dynamic effects of the tax 
cut. 
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2. Dividend tax revenues continue to rise 
by enormous rates. Probably, the reason 
is the decrease by half of the tax rate in 
2005 that stimulates the business. 
3. The high rate of excises has a negative 
effect on the budget revenues – probably 
because of built reserves in 2005, 
decrease of consumption and buying 
cigarettes without excise label. 
As a whole, the conclusion is that the tax reform 
brings results – tax revenues from decreased tax 
rates increase. This can encourage additional tax 
cuts in the beginning of 2007. If there is enough 
determination for reforms, a flat rate of 10 
percent can be introduced for the corporate tax, 
income tax and social security tax. 
 
 
 
Liberalization is a Winning Strategy for the 
Energy Sector in Bulgaria 
Adriana Mladenova 
 
At the end of March the executive director of 
National Electricity Company (NEK) threatened 
the general public with a drastic increase in the 
prices of electricity as a result of the 
forthcoming liberalization of the energy market 
in Bulgaria, and consequently closing down 
third and fourth block of NPP Kozloduy. 
Creation of a competitive liberalized market is 
laid down in the EU Energy Directives 
according to which a common European market 
is expected to begin its operation in 2007. The 
government monopoly in transition, purchase 
and exporting of electricity is set to disappear 
then. For the purpose, until the end of 2006 NEK 
has to be restructured into two companies – one 
for transit and one functioning as a system 
administrator in the electricity sector. 
Although the price of electricity has been rising 
in the country for the last years, the prices of 
electricity in Bulgaria remain among the lowest 
in Europe – for households as well as for the 
industry. Following the pessimistic prophecy of 
the executive director of NEK, the price of the 
electricity in the country will inevitably rise to 
reach the levels of the European market. And as 
such, the burden of the rise in the prices will be 
borne mostly by the household consumers 
according to him. 
Imposing the idea on the public opinion that the 
supply of electricity is a social priority of the 
state makes people turn against private 
companies that are ruled by market signals. 
These firms are ready to invest, to modernize the 
equipment and optimize the expenses, and of 
course – to make profits. The argument that is 
often laid down is that the market mechanism 
will change the current status, which for the 
moment is actually of benefit for consumers. 
According to statements by managers of NEK, 
at the moment the company sells electricity in 
Bulgaria at rather low prices, which in some 
cases even do not cover the costs of production 
and the company cross-subsidizes the losses in 
the internal market through its net income from 
the export of electricity abroad. 
At the same time, the chairman of the State 
Energy and Water Regulatory Commission 
(SEWRC) said in the press that despite the 
enhanced price of coal, the price of electricity 
for households would not rise for the moment. 
We can conclude that the change in costs of 
production are mandated by structural changes 
and increases in the prices of factors of 
production but keeping the prices at these levels 
by the state-owned company cannot be 
guaranteed for long. When a market is 
liberalized and competitive, only then are prices 
perceived as truly objective and as such, there is 
no need for the decisions of the Regulatory 
Commission to be constantly justified, 
especially in the minds of people. The signals 
that we get from NEK are that the company is 
not ruled by market principles only. When the 
third and fourth blocks of NPP Kozloduy close 
down and the export levels of electricity 
decrease (at least in the short run), how is the 
loss from the internal market going to be 
covered? From the other side, the lack of a 
market approach in pricing is a problem as it 
leads to discrepancies and distorts the market 
reality. 
From 2004 onward, the so-called privileged 
consumers have the right to buy electricity 
directly from the producers and to negotiate 
individually the terms and prices of the 
contracts. After almost a year, all enterprises and 
households will be able to take part in the free 
market and buy electricity from different 
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suppliers and traders. That is going to happen in 
the common European energy market. 
So, should we worry about this? 
The irrefutable consequences of competition in 
every sector in the economy are the following: 
 
? Optimization of costs of goods and 
services sold 
? Broadening the set of choices for the 
consumers 
? Tendency of falling prices  
? Improvements in quality of services 
? Investments in capital and technology 
 
Part of the fears come from the fact that the 
energy companies tend to consolidate which in 
turn harms competition. Consolidation of 
enterprises, however, when not mandated by a 
government regulation or protectionism, aims at 
economies of scale or greater efficiency in 
utilization of resources and lessening of 
transaction costs. It is, however, important to 
have a free access to the market and a uniform 
treatment of all parties in order the benefits of 
the competition to be fully realized. 
Bulgaria is characterized by a high level of 
energy consumption per unit of economic 
activity. Studies show that an increase in the 
overall output by 1% leads to an increase in the 
consumption of energy by more than 1%. The 
free market price regulates exactly these 
processes: it is a natural regulatory behavior of 
the energy dependency of the economy. If there 
are not enough inputs for production of 
electricity or the production is not competitive or 
efficient enough, the prices of electricity will go 
up which will, as a result, lead to a decrease in 
consumption, greater usage of alternative energy 
resources, more capital investments that 
optimize and decrease the costs of production. 
Bulgaria has traditionally developed its 
electricity infrastructure. At the same time, 
gasification, co-generation and heat-production 
cause fewer losses of primary energy resources. 
The lack of usage of these alternatives to 
electricity is one of the reasons for the high 
energy dependency of the economy. 
The steps towards abolishing of the “one seller” 
model will lead to a real market. Liberalization 
of the market and abolishing the monopoly of 
NEK in export and import, delivery and transit 
of electricity will have various effects. The 
usage of alternative renewable sources and 
investments in energy efficiency will become a 
real alternative for consumers that are going to 
be more greatly involved in that process. 
Artificial preservation of prices below the 
market ones is not a far-sighted strategy as it 
distorts consumer behavior. At the same time, 
with a liberalized market, strategies and 
coordination among authorities and government 
bodies are not needed. However, this is not the 
case with a government monopoly in the energy 
sector. That is important for the Bulgarian 
market as at the moment such coordination is 
missing. 
If we have a look at the liberalization of the 
market in Europe, we can conclude that it is 
good for the sector as a whole. During the last 
ten years the prices of electricity on European 
markets has gone down by 15% in real terms. 
The size of the change, of course, differs in the 
countries as it depends on the particular level of 
liberalization. The decrease in the prices for 
industry is greater than the decrease for 
households. 
Last month, the European Commission declared 
that it is ready to implement a common energy 
policy. However, opposition of France and 
Spain to strategic deals with big utility 
companies is a clear indication of the desire of 
the European powers to keep the leading energy 
companies under their control. Still, the energy 
market is dominated by interests and politics 
rather than by market principles. That is fully 
true for Bulgaria, as well. But the benefits of 
liberalization should not be doubted because the 
only interests that truly dictate the market are the 
ones of consumers and producers. 
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How Could the Government Save Some 
Money and Reduce Foreign Debt at Once? 
Veliko Dimitrov 
 
Not long ago the Bulgarian National Bank 
(BNB) released preliminary data for the 
country’s gross foreign debt that was EUR 14,3 
billion at the end of January this year or 
approximately 60,7 % of the prognosticated 
GDP for 2006. Among others, this figure 
contains the debt of the government sector (EUR 
4,15 billion), which, although has been 
constantly declining since 2001, shows that 
every Bulgarian taxpayer owed money to the 
rest of the world in the amount of EUR 1 393*. 
The gross government debt is solely long-term, 
nearly evenly split between non-securitized 
loans (simple credits) and bond-bounded debts, 
namely the eurobonds and the global bonds 
issued on international markets by the previous 
Bulgarian government. 
I purposely do not take it into account that part 
of the issued bonds (about 1/5) are held by 
residents of Bulgaria and thus do not represent a 
foreign but an internal debt. In the current 
situation this is an accurate approach by all 
means, bearing in mind that part of the bonds 
issued inside the country are respectively held 
by non-residents and are de facto considered as 
liabilities to the rest of the world. On the other 
hand, as it has already been pointed out, the 
aggregate public debt comprises also the 
obligations of government enterprises and 
government bails. 
The parameters of the issued government bonds 
are as follows: 
 
 Value  
(EUR, millions) Maturity 
Annual interest 
rate 
Market price 
(% of nominal, 01.01.06) 
Eurobonds 250 03.2007 7,25 % 105 % 
Global bonds in euro 835,5 01.2013 7,50 % 124 % 
Global bonds in dollars 1 050 01.2015 8,25 % 121 % 
Source: BNB; Ministry of Finance 
 
If the government is willing to manage the 
foreign debt, there are numerous possible 
combinations: starting with buying back all 
securities today and going all the way long to 
paying what needs to be paid bit by bit. The 
choice of action depends generally on the 
financial sustainability of the country and the 
predominant expectations of the authorized 
government officials for the future development 
of the market. We could not know what are the 
exact expectancies for the market, though we are 
quite able to know what financial resources the 
government is disposing of. 
According to the latest figures released by the 
Ministry of Finance, the current fiscal reserve 
(the amount of the annual budget revenue that 
exceeds the expenditures) is slightly over 4,25 
billion. For the second year in a row, the 
minimal reserve that is to be kept must not fall 
under 2,5 billion, which means that the rest of 
about 1,75 billion leva could be imperturbably 
spent on paying off government debts. 
Of course this could be the case if the 
government has not already figured out a 
“better” use of the money like investing into a 
huge project in atom energy sector or, which is 
nearly the same – bailing private investments 
there. There is also a need to bear in mind that 
almost all financial resources are put into 
accounts at the Bulgarian National Bank and the 
interest rates they bring to their owners (i.e. 
budget) are miserable and are not more than 2,5 
% annually. 
 
What else could the government do with an 
over-reserve of 1,75 billion leva? 
1. To buy right away all eurobonds at 105 
% of the nominal price, which would 
cost EUR 262,5 million or to wait for 
about a year to the maturity and to pay 
then 268,125 both principal and 
interest3. The net present value of these 
268,125 million, payable in one year at a 
2,5 % discount rate is EUR 261,58 
                                                 
3 We accept that an interest for a whole year has to be 
paid and it is payable upon redeeming the principal. 
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millions. Since it is about a million 
cheaper, it is right to await the maturity. 
2. Buying back the global bonds now and 
today would cost the reserve EUR 1 036 
million. If one wait for the maturity, 
which is in 2013, then would have to be 
paid more according to the net present 
value figure – EUR 1 065,6 million, 
which includes both – discounted 
principle and interest payments 
(altogether six – on 15 of January). In 
short, if the government buys now it 
would save its taxpayers about EUR 
29,6 million.  
3. Paying off all debts related to the global 
bonds in dollars now would cost EUR 1 
270,5 million and paying the debt off at 
the maturity - altogether EUR 1 341,6 
million, Figures are in favor of buying 
today – amount of money saved: EUR 
71,1 million. 
In this example I disregard the existence of 
transaction costs, which would make deals more 
expensive and thus logically less profitable. I 
still believe though, that the final results would 
be relatively unchanged. I also set aside possible 
alterations in market conjuncture and / or 
potential changes in the bond contract 
parameters like swaps. 
To be able to save about EUR 100 million, the 
Bulgarian government should have at a free 
disposal and also agree to use about EUR 2,3 
billion. That is generally an immense amount of 
money that not so many governments could 
afford to spend overnight without any serious 
implications on their economies. Thus, the 
presence of a huge fiscal over-reserve in 
Bulgaria allows the use of about EUR 0,9 billion 
(currently in foreign exchange anyway), which 
would pay off over 1/3 of the bond bounded 
government debt and save the taxpayers over 35 
million leva. 
Besides the opportunity to reduce foreign debt 
that is to be paid off soon or later anyway, there 
are also some other reasons backing the 
direction of the fiscal over-reserve to buying 
back bonds: 
• Raising the credit rating of the country – 
easier and cheaper access to credits for 
the government and for the private 
sector as well. 
• Improving interest of the international 
investors towards Bulgaria due to lower 
investment risk, financial sustainability 
• Using the accumulated, through higher 
than the breakeven point taxation, over-
reserve in the best possible way 
• Preventing its laying out on inefficient 
or even harmful for the economy 
activities 
• And finally reducing the amount of 
money each taxpayer owes on average 
to the rest of the world. 
 
----------------- 
* The Public debt is actually higher, which is due to 
the fact that the government sector does not account 
for debts of banks and non-bank enterprises with over 
50 % government participation, and for the debts 
guaranteed by the public sector as well. 
 
 
One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Ataka 
and the Effects of Nationalization 
Kevin P. Allen 
 
Despite recent scandals which have resulted in 
internal discord amongst members of Ataka, the 
party retains relatively stable levels of support 
among its core constituents. The upcoming 
protests in regard to the visit of U.S. Secretary of 
State Condoleeza Rice will illuminate to what 
effect, if any, these scandals have had on the 
party.  Irrespective one can assume that the party 
will persist and that its’ very existence should be 
a cause for concern as the social and economic 
proposals endorsed by Ataka will undoubtedly 
hinder the development of Bulgaria and the 
Bulgarian people. These proposals (usually 
delivered in the form of populist rhetoric) are 
encompassed in two documents, one of which is 
known as the “20 Principles.”  Among the more 
damaging directives in the “20 Principles” is the 
idea to ‘reconsider’ the privatization process 
in Bulgaria, a euphemistic manner of calling for 
the nationalization of private property.  The 
effects of such an action would be far reaching 
in that the realization of the policy would: 
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- deprive the government of large fiscal 
gains resulting from the sale of state-
owned enterprises. 
- result in severe economic damage to the 
general public by nationalizing the 
216,00 plus small and medium sized 
enterprises. 
- have a significant negative effect on 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 
country. 
 
The Economic Impact of Privatization 
Prior to discussing the possible fiscal gains 
associated with the privatization process, I 
would like to insert a disclaimer regarding the 
utilization of funds resulting from privatization. 
One might be quick to argue that money 
acquired by the state is often funneled off into 
the pockets of avaricious politicians and the 
impact of privatizing large companies is thus 
diminished. I recognize the potential for such 
behavior however the issues are very much 
different and the existence of corruption is a 
much more serious impediment to the well being 
of the country than is privatization. As such I 
speak of privatization in a theoretical sense i.e. 
in a sense that lawmakers will one day give the 
problem of corruption serious consideration, 
strip MP’s of their immunity and make a 
concerted effort to identify and prosecute all 
those engaged in illicit activities. 
That being said, the privatization of larger 
enterprises has a very significant impact on 
Bulgaria’s economy. One example to reference 
is that of the Bulgarian Telecommunications 
Company (BTC). The total financial effect of 
the sale of 65% of the company to Viva 
Ventures amounts to over EUR 1.1 billion 
alone4. The remaining 35% of BTC was offered 
in the form of 2.8 million shares on the 
Bulgarian Stock Exchange. As of April 4th the 
selling price of one share of BTC stock was 
10.20 leva5 giving all shares a value of 
approximately BGN 28.5 million or just over 
EUR 14 million. Other examples of large fiscal 
transfers resulting from privatization can be seen 
in the energy and banking sectors. 
The partial privatization (67%) of seven state-
owned electricity distribution companies 
                                                 
4 Summary Report of the Privatization Process – 
Privatization Agency, Rep. of Bulgaria  
5 Bulgarian Stock Exchange, Sofia 
garnered approximately EUR 693 million6. The 
project was partitioned into three regions and the 
winning tenders were as follows: the Czech 
company CEZ paid EUR 281 million for the 
western package, German company EON paid 
almost EUR 141 million for the northeastern 
package, and Austrian company EVN paid EUR 
271 million for the southeastern package. If fully 
privatized, we can assume the total fiscal effect 
would reach approximately EUR 1.03 billion. In 
another deal worth EUR 260 million, a 
consortium of Mitsui & Co, Toshiba, and the 
Japanese Bank of International Cooperation will 
redevelop four units of the Maritza Iztok 2 
thermal power plant. 
The long-term process of privatizing the banking 
sector has also had a significant effect on the 
Bulgarian economy. One major player in the 
process was the Banking Consolidation 
Company (BCC).  The BCC, established in 
1992, was designed to expedite the banking 
consolidation process, manage the State interests 
in commercial banks, and establish an effective 
banking system within the country.7 The first 
major step came in 1994 when the BCC sold its 
entire interest in six banks and reduced its shares 
in two others. In 1997, the company adopted a 
privatization strategy for each of the state-owned 
banks in which it was a major shareholder. 
These banks include Bulbank, Express Bank, 
Post Bank, Hebros Bank and Biochim. The 1998 
sale of approximately 78% of BCC’s shares in 
Post Bank brought USD 38 million. The BCC 
later sold its stakes in Bulbank to a consortium 
of Unicredit and Allianz for some EUR 360 
million.8 As well, Express Bank was purchased 
by the French firm Societe Generale for some 
EUR 36 million. 
In short, privatization brings in a great deal of 
money for the state. As of December 2004, the 
total number of state-owned enterprises sold was 
roughly 2,878. In addition, stakes and shares in 
around 5,181 enterprises and 2,303 self-
contained facilities have been sold. Over the 
course of twelve years, the total overall financial 
effect from the deals signed concerning the 
transfer of enterprises is approximately USD 
9.74 billion9 (an amount roughly equal to the 
country’s 1995 GDP10 and approaching 1/6th of 
                                                 
6 Ibid. 
7 A Review of Bulgarian Privatization – OECD, 1998 
8 Press Review - b-info.com, July 2000 
9 Summary Report of the Privatization Process – 
Privatization Agency, Rep. of Bulgaria 
10 Black Sea Energy Review.   
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the country’s 2005 GDP11) while the actual 
payments made amount to approximately USD 
4.6 billion12. 
SME’s and the Effect of Reconsidering 
Privatization 
The decision to reconsider privatization would 
not only affect large enterprises in the banking 
and energy sectors but would have severe 
consequences on small and medium-sized 
enterprises in the country. As previously 
mentioned there are some 216,000 SME’s which 
account for 99.2 percent of total enterprises and 
99.8 percent of all private enterprises.13 In 2003, 
small and medium-sized enterprises were 
responsible for the employment of some 1.1 
million people in Bulgaria, approximately 79 
percent of the total number of employees in the 
private sector.14 
An examination of the impact of SME’s across 
various sectors will assist in understanding the 
negative impact of nationalization in Bulgaria. 
In manufacturing, SME’s comprise 98.9 
percent of all enterprises in the sector. The 
number of people employed by SME’s 
constitutes just over 63 percent of all 
employment in the sector. Regarding 
construction, SME’s account for 99.6 percent 
of all enterprises in the sector and employ over 
                                                 
11 CIA World Factbook - Bulgaria. 
12 “Summary Report of the Privatization Process.” 
Privatization Agency - Rep. of Bulgaria. 
13 “Annual Report on the Condition and Development 
of SME’s in Bulgaria, 2004” – SME Promotion 
Agency. 
14 Ibid. 
85 percent of those working in the sector. 
Medium sized enterprises alone account for over 
35 percent of the employment.  SME’s dominate 
the wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor 
vehicles, and personal and household goods 
sectors. Large enterprises account for only .03 
percent of all enterprises while micro enterprises 
make up just under 95 percent. Trade is the 
most attractive sector for SME’s who employ 
over 95 percent of all people working in the 
sector. In the hotel and restaurant sectors, 
SME’s account for over 99 percent of all 
enterprises while similar numbers can be found 
in the transport, storage, communication, real 
estate, and business activities sectors. Due to 
the nature of production in some sectors such as 
mining and electricity, SME’s are not nearly as 
dominant.15 
A brief look at the introduction to the Annual 
Report on the Condition and Development of 
SME’s in Bulgaria, 2004 will provide perhaps 
the most compelling argument against the 
nationalization of private property. 
“Small and medium-sized enterprises account 
for 99 percent of total Bulgarian enterprises. 
They generate 79 percent of employment, 75 
percent of the turnover, and 61 percent of the 
value added of private enterprises.” The report 
later adds: “They account for 54 percent of the 
export and 73 percent of the import of private 
business.” 
                                                 
15 Ibid.  All of the statistics in the preceding 
paragraph can be found in the Annual Report. 
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To reverse the process of privatization would 
have serious negative effects on Bulgarian 
SME’s. Due to the number of people who are 
employed by SME’s, one could assume that the 
implementation of such a policy would result in 
extremely high unemployment, serious 
deterioration of a large part of the service sector, 
and acute macro-economic damage to the 
Bulgarian economy. 
 
Nationalization and Foreign Direct 
Investment 
In regards to FDI, it should first be noted that the 
effects of FDI are not sole monetary; foreign 
firms also bring access to global markets, 
transfer technologies, train local executives, and 
often provide better paying jobs than domestic 
firms.  
That being said, the reversal of the privatization 
process will virtually halt all foreign direct 
investment (FDI) into Bulgaria. This is 
significant as inflows of FDI account for a 
sizeable portion of funds in the country. The 
pending entry into the European Union has 
heightened investor interest in both Bulgaria, a 
trend that is clearly visible when one considers 
the increases in FDI over the past few years. In 
2000, FDI in Bulgaria measured around EUR 
1.08 billion. Since that time it has fallen once in 
2001 (down to EUR 896 million) and steadily 
increased measuring approximately EUR 2.5 
billion in 2004.16 
One of the largest investors is Business Park 
Sofia, a Bulgarian firm who, in conjunction with 
the construction group German Lindner, was 
awarded a First Class Investor certificate upon 
the agreement of a three-year investment 
amounting to BGN 1.6 billion. There are 
numerous other examples in the same vein.  The 
Canadian firm Dundee Precious Metals agreed 
to a two-year, BGN 1.1 billion investment to 
modernize the process of extracting and 
processing ore in Chelopech. The company is 
slated to invest another BGN 101 million in the 
future. In May 2005, the French company 
Montupet agreed to a BGN 70 million 
investment to establish a car part factory in 
Rousse. Trakya Glass Bulgaria, a subsidiary of 
the Turkish holding Sisecam, is investing some 
BGN 367 million to produce glass in the town of 
                                                 
16 “Bulgarian Reforms Foster Growth, Foreign 
Investment.”  World Bank. 
Turgovishte.17 To allay any fears stemming from 
the last example (i.e. that Turkish companies are 
buying up Bulgaria), the largest investors by 
country are Austria (32.5%), Switzerland 
(14.2%) and the United Kingdom (13.5%)18. The 
point here is that foreign direct investment is 
crucial for the Bulgarian economy and according 
to the website invest.bg, accounts for almost 
11% of the country’s GDP. 
As demonstrated by the preceding paragraphs, 
Ataka’s plan to ‘reconsider’ privatization is 
deeply flawed in many respects. As well, it 
would erroneous to assume that 1Siderov and his 
party have the capacity to somehow successfully 
reverse the privatization process without causing 
severe damage to the country’s economy and 
leaving hundreds of thousands unemployed. 
Thus we are left with the following questions: 
 
- Does Ataka have the USD 4.6 billion to 
cover the income gained from financial 
transfers stemming from privatization? 
- How will the party provide employment 
for the roughly 1 million people who 
stand to lose their jobs as a result of 
nationalization? (This is particularly 
important considering the current levels 
of unemployment in the country.) 
- How will they preserve the country’s 
service sector as it is largely dependent 
on SME’s who will ultimately be put out 
of business as a result of 
nationalization? 
- How will the party recover the BGN 3 
billion lost in foreign direct investment 
as a result of nationalization? 
- Does the party have a definitive plan on 
how to go about engaging in 
nationalization without an end result that 
parallels that of Zimbabwe? 
 
Siderov and his party members have plenty of 
bad ideas and the party has neither the financial 
resources nor the experience to adequately 
handle the consequences of their own proposals. 
As shown by the preceding examples, the party 
offers little more than implausible and poorly 
thought out solutions. Committing economic 
                                                 
17 “FDI in Bulgaria up by 11.5% Jan – Sept.”  
Bulgaria National Bank / Evroportal.bg  
18 Ibid.  
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suicide will do absolutely nothing to improve the 
quality of life in Bulgaria. It is time for the 
general public to look past populist slogans and 
realize that Ataka can only set Bulgaria on a 
regressive economic path. 
 
 
Gypsies’ Contribution to Market Reforms 
Krassen Stanchev 
 
From a societal stratum with most pro-market 
economic behavior, Bulgarian gypsies, after 
1989, have become a key reform agent although 
this role has never been properly reflected and 
explained. In this article I would like to discuss 
the specific niches they occupied in the last 16-
17 years, how they were influenced by the 
culture and how they were motivated by outside 
factors and welfare state incentives. As in the 
previous article, I speculate on and attempt to 
offer an interpretation of well-known facts and 
developments without pretending to be 
empirically rigid. I am confident that a 
specialized survey is likely to provide sufficient 
hardcore evidence to the interpretation I offer. 
 
Definition of property rights with the help of 
gypsies 
 
Gypsy entrepreneur: a bare foot capitalist 
At the eve of the late 1980’s reforms, the Gypsy 
population of Bulgaria had played an important 
role. Before the political reforms of November 
1989 - June 1990 (the political crisis of the 
Communist regime and the first free post-
Communist elections), the regime had loosened 
its’ grip on the economy allowing private 
individuals to establish individual small 
businesses in the services and other sectors.19 
In countries with oppressed individual rights, 
small changes lead to significant unintended 
consequences. The gypsy business in the late 
1970’s and 1980’s have contributed to two key 
justifications of those partial reforms: they have 
demonstrated that private initiative is not subject 
to eradication, that it flourishes in all societal 
                                                 
19 That partial liberalization was launched by the 
Decree 56 of 1989 (titled “On Citizen’s Economic 
Initiative”) that prescribed how companies are to be 
registered and what taxes they pay. 
strata and that it produces prosperity gains on all 
levels. 
In the economy the key manifestation of private 
property right is the right to be a consumer, a 
master of own preferences and the choice to buy 
what is wanted from whom it is wanted and at a 
price that is freely negotiable. The consumer 
surplus drives this right even under Communist 
conditions. This phenomenon is well discussed 
in the literature20 and we have seen that via the 
role of Bulgaria Gypsies in the previous article. 
The institutional side of the consumer surplus is 
that it helps in searching and establishing the 
link between production and consumption: under 
normal conditions, if consumers do not need 
certain goods and services then the producer 
does not have other prospect besides closing 
production. 
These “normal conditions” are well-defined 
individual rights to private property and 
consumer choice and absence of coercion and 
plunder.  Under the system of central planning 
and limited to homes and small slots of land 
private property, as was the situation in Bulgaria 
between 1948 and early 198921, all forms of 
servicing consumer rights were forms of a 
deconstruction of the status quo (while private 
                                                 
20 See: Mansur Olson, Power and Prosperity, New 
York, Basic Books, 1998, William W. Lewis, The 
Power of Productivity, Chicago, Chicago University 
Press, 2004. 
21 In Bulgaria, the “excessive ownership” of homes 
(flats and houses) was nationalized (in 1947-1948); in 
fact there was a rationing of this type of property.  
However, during the entire communist period private 
homeownership was comparatively high – 80—85%, 
the urban population retained full ownership of their 
houses in the rural areas and the slot of land around 
them (40-50% of the urban population has had such 
ownership); the ownership titles on arable land, 
forest, etc. remained private but the use of land was 
“collectivized”, more or less completely after 1962 
while the forest was nationalized.  Totally 
expropriated were about 4,500 – 5,000 families.  One 
of the key reforms after 1989 was the restitution of all 
types of ownership – see: Krassen Stanchev, 
Denationalization in Bulgaria, in: Contemporary 
Economic Libertarianism in Bulgaria, IME, 2004, 
available also at: www.easibulgaria.org . 
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business has been effectively treated as crime in 
all walks of life until early 1989 when the 
prohibition was partially lifted from some 
sectors). The deconstruction: 
 
• Defines the limits of central planning, 
• “Creates” and sustains the alternative to 
central planning, 
• Destroys the central planning since 
consumer surplus motivates plundering 
from state owned assets. 
 
In this situation, the Gypsies in Bulgaria are the 
only societal group to fulfill the above said 
deconstruction; other groups were performing it 
by accident and on a sporadic basis. This is 
because the Gypsies as a group were: 
 
a) Deprived of social status, career and 
influence, 
b) Completely pauperized, a “proletariat with 
any avant-garde”, 
c) Group market economy actors under 
Communism. 
 
The liberalization of the hard currency shop 
trading in 1970’s and the involvement of Sofia 
and other big city Gypsy communities 
performed an example of barefoot capitalism. 
Such capitalism was, however, not only the 
mercantile into highly valued goods as jeans. 
Besides the already mentioned specific craft 
niches and agriculture free-lance, an even more 
important market role of the Gypsies was their 
involvement in the creation and functioning of 
the early 1980’s open air bazaars of “Iliantzi” 
and “Malashevtzi”.22 Both were the first official 
alternatives to centrally planned distribution, 
official in the sense that they were not disturbed 
by authorities in their first weekend and 
consequently in daily operations. 
In early 1989 and then after political changes of 
late 1989-early 1990 and with the start of the 
economic reforms of 1991 such markets grew in 
size and spread around the country.23 
                                                 
22 Both are named after villages, which in the 1970’s 
have become Sofia districts. 
23 Bulgaria has successfully led economic reforms 
Later, the role of the Gypsies as a group of 
almost exclusive bazaar operators gradually 
faded away. They were substituted by other 
“foreigners”, Arabs, Afghani and Palestinians 
who were settling in Bulgaria on their way to 
Europe or who had chosen not to go back to 
their countries since Bulgaria offered better 
prospects. This was the same phenomenon of 
barefoot capitalism but more international and 
globalized as not only the goods but the 
merchants and buyers were from many different 
countries. (The buyers become international in 
1991 and especially in 1992, after the outbreak 
of the wars in ex-Yugoslavia.) 
From this moment on, a new specialization has 
begun of bazaar Gypsy intermediaries.  
In 2000 and 2001 Prof. Julian Konstantinov 
observed with criticism the operations of the 
Gypsies on “Iliantzi” market and on a similar 
bazaar in the town of Dimitrovgrad. He found 
that in those markets there was a special 
additional service offered – fake invoices, and 
that this service was totally dominated by 
Gypsies.24 Those were (are) not invoices for the 
goods purchased on the market. The service is 
issuing invoices for tax reporting on a desired 
amount of money (but not 5-6 thousand US 
dollars) against 1% of the book price (or a lump 
sum). Mr. Konstantinov complains that the 
invoice trading by “mostly Gypsy” vendors 
takes place before the indifferent eyes of the 
street police on the market, especially in 
Dimitrovgrad. At the end of the day, however, 
such invoices are in great demand: the marginal 
tax rate in 2000 and 2001 is 65% for a medium 
size entrepreneur and the regulatory system is 
characteristic with its harassing controls over 
private enterprise.  
                                                                         
according to then best Central European standards 
between December 1990 and the fall of 1991 when 
they were somewhat delayed due to elections and 
eventually stopped in late 1992 due to political crisis. 
24 Julian Konstantinov. Kam forlmalisirane na sivata 
ikonomika v Bargaria?  (Targovtzite na otkritite 
nazari). Dokrad of terenno prouchvane iuli-avgust 
2001.  - Evgenii Daynov (redactor). Sivata 
Ikonomika v Balgaria: prichini, sledstvia, politiki, 
Sofia, Tzentar za sotzialni praktikiq 2002, str. 83-84 I 
sl.  (In Bulgarian, the English title:  Julian 
Konstantinov, On the Formalization of the Grey  
Economy in Bulgaria: Open Air Bazaar Merchants, 
(A Report from a Field Servey), in: Evgenii Daynov 
(editor), The Grey Economy in Bulgaria: Reason, 
Consequences, Sofia, The Center for Social Practices, 
2002, p. 83-84 a.f.). 
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Copyrights promoter in hard spirits 
Copyrights and patent protection used to be one 
of the key problems of the Bulgarian economy in 
the beginning of the 1990’s. The legacy of the 
Communism in this area is that those rights are 
relatively well established in high tech and 
scientific fields but almost non-existent in 
trademarks in food processing, pharmaceutical, 
perfumery and wine industries. More 
specifically, they existed on paper but the actual 
implementation and protection did not present a 
problem in Communist years due to the state 
ownership of enterprises and government 
monopoly on wholesale and retail trade. 
In the early transition years it was generally 
quite easy to enter those markets, especially the 
wine and spirit industry. 
Gypsy entrepreneurs, some of whom served the 
hard-currency-shops trading in 1970 and 1980’s, 
somehow naturally directed their ingenuity 
towards those markets. 
Production of fake alcoholic beverages by 
mostly Gypsy vendors has had at least three 
positive impacts: 
1) They dismantled and eventually 
expropriated the state monopoly on the 
production of fake alcohol, which 
existed for years undisturbed and 
flourishing as part of the centrally 
planned “wine-proms”; notably, the 
Gypsy vendors produced fake wines and 
hard spirits at quality levels that were 
comparable and even better than those 
of the state wine industry;  
2) Hard spirit and wine lovers with 
relatively low purchasing power had the 
opportunity to tastes they could not 
afford otherwise; 
3) The fake production had eventually 
forced formal “wine-proms” implement 
quality controls systems, consumer 
information, apply brand controls and 
rationalize production and marketing. 
There were other factors that supported 
development in this direction – privatization of 
the wine industries (although somewhat delayed) 
and establishment of sectoral self-regulatory 
bodies in 1999 in addition to the opening of the 
retail markets to large retail chains (Metro, Billa) 
and so on. But the Gypsy vendors were the first 
to identify the niche and to challenge the 
government monopoly. Today it is possible to 
argue that there were better and more civilized 
ways to push for reforms but I can hardly 
imagine any reforms emerging by itself given 
the government reluctance to privatize wine 
industry that was common for number of 
governments before 1997. 
This industry was viewed as a “strategic one”, as 
a “core Bulgarian comparative advantage”, and 
from these notions the, mostly Socialist, 
government derived the “justification” to 
postpone privatizations until 1996. The actual 
disagreement with the production and marketing 
of fake alcoholic beverages stemmed in those 
years from the fact that someone else is doing 
the same business as state owned wineries. The 
state monopoly lasted for more than forty years. 
“Tzar Kiro” – the most famous Gypsy vendor in 
fake spirits, although it is rather a nickname - 
has been in this business for not more than four 
years. 
A part of the production concepts are now in the 
hands of formal wine producers, they continue 
selling healthy drinks at low price. 
Nature produce collectors, determinants of 
“public goods”and aid addiction 
The definition and redistribution of property 
rights through privatization has been slower in 
Bulgaria than in other countries.25 Particularly 
unclear those rights remained in the area land 
ownership (the restitution proceeded between 
1991 and 1998, and some instances of collective 
use were sustained). Simultaneously, the 
redistributionist policies via “social benefits” 
and “social aid” during the same period were 
particularly non-transparent and unreasonable 
and to a large extent remain unreformed even 
today. 
In this respect is one of the most important, 
positive but publicly controversial role of the 
Bulgarian Gypsies in the transition. 
By ways of culture and due to social status they 
collect everything that is not properly collected 
but could be of some use. These could be trees 
and wild mushrooms in the forests, garbage 
paper, metal scrap, electricity distribution wires, 
street sign, maternity “benefits”, “social aid”, 
heating subsidies for poor families, electricity 
bills and anything else. 
Public “goods” do not exist per se. Some of 
those could be seen as public when and if they 
                                                 
25 For details, see: Krassen Stanchev, op.cit.  
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are available for everybody’s use amidst little or 
costly opportunities to exclude free riders and 
punish them. 
In general, what is not protected as belonging to 
someone is not valued. The Bulgarian press and 
public opinion blame “The Gypsies” for the 
utilization of such public goods. 
The actual constellation is very different and the 
Gypsy collection is: 
• Of great significance for the 
determination of the value of the 
properties that were either privatized or 
returned to previous owners but 
remained unprotected for a certain 
period of time; in cases where the 
private property was reestablished but 
remained unattended, the Gypsy 
collectors motivated owners to be 
vigilant and organize protection on their 
own, to the extend it happened the 
Gypsy collectors, as a rule disappeared 
from the sight; 
• Completely in the normal course of the 
events and in the framework of the law 
when they benefit from otherwise 
useless government programs; racist 
politicians and members of the public 
usually blame “the Gypsies” but, in fact, 
Not He is to be Blamed Who Eats the 
Cabbage Cake – That’s the One Who 
Gives It, as Bulgarian saying goes;  
• Very useful for the separation of the 
urban waste and for its recycling; for the 
time being, the latter is almost not at all 
common practice in Bulgaria; for this 
reason the quasi-industrial separation is 
done manually and sold to recycling 
companies; with the gradual 
industrialization the Gypsies would be 
forced out of this niche;  
• With regard to metal constructions with 
public functions and the alleged habit of 
Gypsies to collect those as the Bulgarian 
press claims (i.e. metal element of 
sewage facilities, street signs and 
electric wires), it needs to be mentioned 
that it is typical only for Bulgaria, 
although Gypsies live in other countries 
as well. The key explanation here is that 
there is a regulatory problem related to 
the oversight on scrap buyers and 
recycling plant: they buy such metal 
articles that should normally be not 
subject to recycling; 
• Perfectly legitimate with regards to 
natural produce of forests (mushrooms, 
wood, herbs, etc.) – the ownership of the 
forest is 85% public and poorly 
regulated while there is a significant 
demand for wild mushrooms and herbs 
by respective industries in Bulgaria and 
abroad. 
I think it is obvious that none of the above 
instances represents a violent expropriation. 
There were clashes between restitution 
landowners and Gypsy collectors but they 
quickly disappeared when owners began 
protecting their properties and production. 
 
The positive role of the Gypsies 
The eventual impact of the Gypsy collection is 
that it caused a spontaneous effort to protect land 
and agriculture production by vigilant farmers 
and guards hired by farmers.  Similar was the 
story with common village properties, trees and 
fields. When those are not protected Gypsies and 
everybody else could reap the harvest and sell it 
to the market. 
Similar is the case with “Gypsy”crafts, they 
produce knifes, axes and other metal 
instruments. The raw material inputs are 
basically collected entirely from the garbage 
litter. It takes time to do this job and it is far 
from pleasant but the unemployment is high, the 
labor cost is very low and often craftsmen have 
the family and friends taking care of the 
supplies. The human capital and the skills to 
produce the instruments also come from 
tradition and family. The cash is needed for the 
fuel and coal. As I know from a survey of 
informal credit I conducted in 1996 and 1997, 
these costs are roughly $ 500 a year. There are 
schemes to reduce them: use heating subsidies 
provided by the government in coal or wood or 
alternatively, collect wood in the forest where 
and if possible. 
As in all cases of collection, there is a use of 
resources that otherwise are neither valued nor 
used and they are put into service someone 
benefit or further converted into capital. 
 
The misunderstanding 
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The lack of normal understanding of Gypsies’ 
ways and days in the last sixteen years of 
Bulgaria history are typical for the Bulgarian 
press, the public opinion and newly emerged 
chauvinist political parties. 
More importantly, however, they are 
misunderstood by the agencies and policies to 
support “Gypsies”. The most common 
development in this respect is the aid addition on 
behalf of the donor. If Gypsies take care of 
themselves, as they have proven they can over 
years, the “benefactors” will be forced out of 
job.  
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